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COLUMBIA RIVER TREATY FISHING RIGHTS

Since time immemorial, the Columbia River and its tributaries were viewed by the
Columbia River Basin tribes as "a great table where all the Indians came to partake." More
than a century after the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation, the
Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation of Oregon, the Confederated Tribes
and Bands of the Yalcama Indian Nation, and the Nez Perce Tribe signed the treaties which
created their reservations, the tribes' place at the table has been subordinated to energy
production and other non-Indian land and water development Today, the Columbia River
treaty tribes struggle.for a very small fraction of their reserved fishing rights. The treaties -the supreme law of the land under the United States Constitution -- promised more.
The Columbia River treaty tribes reserved the right to fish at all usual and accustomed
fishing stations "in common with" the citizens of the United State% The fishing right means
more than the right of Indians to hang a net in an empty river.' However, Columbia River
runs of sockeye, coho, and spring, summer, and fall chinook have declined drastically since
the mid-1800's? Where once the Columbia produced annual runs of at least 10-16 million
salmon, its runs are now diminished to tens of thousands. The devastation of fish runs is
inimical to Indian treaties and the United States' trust responsibilities to tribes.
CANONS OF CONSTkUCTION
Canons of construction unique to Federal Indian law are manifestations of the federal
government's trust relationship with Indian tribes. Courts rely on the canons of construction
when interpreting treaties, executive orders, and statutes pertaining to tribes and in reviewing
federal actions affecting Indian people. The following is a summary of the primary cannons
of Federal Indian law:
1.

Indian treaties must be interpreted so as to promote their central

Seufert Brothers Co. v. United States, 249 U.S. 194, 197 (1919).
2 Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Association,
443 U.S. 658,679 (1979).
3 A run is the annual return of adult salmon and steelhead trout Total runs include
those fish that are harvested prior to reaching any dams. See Generally, U.S. COMPTROLLER
GENERAL, HYDROELECDUC DAMS: ISSUES SURROUNDING COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN JUVENILE
FISH BYPASSES, H.R. Rep. No. 90-180, at 8(1990).

purposes;4
2.

Treaties are to be interpreted as the Indians themselves would have
understood them;5

3.

Indian treaties are to be liberally construed in favor of the Indians;6

4.

Ambiguous expressions are to be resolved in favor of the Indians? and

5.

A treaty is not a grant of rights to the Indians but a reservation of those
rights not granted away.°

The canons of construction reflect judicial recognition of the federal government's

4 United States v. Winans, 198 U. S. 371, 381 (1905).
5 Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Association,
443 U.S. 658, 676 (1979); Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 347 U.S. 620, 630 (1970); Tulee v.
Washington, 315 U.S. 681, 684 (1942); Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 11(1899); Worcester v.
Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet) 515 (1832); Seufert Bros. v. United States, 249 U.S. 194, 198
(1919); United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905). See generally Fail< S. COHEN,
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 221 - 225 (1982).
6 Or phrased slightly differently, treaties must be read, not in isolation but in light of the
common notions of the day and the assumptions of those who drafted them. Passenger
Fishing Vessel Association, 443 U.S. at 676; Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 199
(1975); Choctaw Nation v. United States, 318 U.S. 423 (1943); Tulee v. Washington, 315
U.S. 681, 684 (1942); Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 78, 89 (1918).
7 McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission, 411 U.S. 164 (1973); Carpenter v.
Shaw, 280 U.S. 363 (1930); Fleming v. McCustain, 215 U.S. 56, 59-60 (1909); Winters v.
United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908). In Winters the Court stated:
By a rule of interpretation of agreements and treaties with the Indians,
ambiguities occurring will be resolved from the standpoint of the Indians. And
the rule should certainly be applied to determining between two inferences, one
of which would support the purpose of the agreement and the other impair or
defeat it On account of their relation to the government, it cannot be supposed
that the Indians intended to exclude by formal words every inference which
might militate against and defeat the declarecipurpose of themselves and the
government, even it could be supposed that they had the foresight to foresee
the "double sense" which might some time be urged against them. Id. at 576577.
United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905).
2

obligation to protect and enhance tribal rights. Similarly, the canons provide guidance to
federal agencies involved in the co-management of the Columbia River tribes' treaty fishery
and water resources.

FEDERAL TRUST RESPONSIBILITY
The United States stands in a trust or fiduciary relationship to the Columbia River
treaty tribes.9 The trust relationship is a legal doctrine which embodies the many promises
made by the federal government to Indian tribes. The promises include but are not limited to
protection of: tribal sovereignty and self-government tribe's from state interference; and, the
protection of tribal people and tribal natural resources. The trust doctrine governs all aspects
of federal government actions which in any way affect the tribes.
The trust doctrine sets limits on the exercise of federal power over Indian people.'
Treaty language, which often speaks in terms of "securing" to tribe's lands and resources
while promising to promote and improve tribal well-being, exemplifies the constraints on the
exercise of federal power over Indian affairs." Treaties made with Indian tribes (and that

eTh

9 United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206 (1983); Nance v. Environmental Protection
Agency, 645 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1981); Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 236 (1974); United
States v. Mason, 412 U.S. 391 (1973); United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks, 329 U.S.
40, 47 (1946); Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286,296-97 (1942); Tulee v. State,
315 U.S. 681 (1942); United States v. Santa Fe Pac. Ry., 314 U.S. 339 (1941); Shoshone
Tribes v. United States, 299 U.S. 476 (1937); United States v. Creek Nation, 295, 103 (1935);
United States v. Candelaria, 271 U.S. 432 (1926); United States v. Panye, 264 U.S. 446, 448
(1924); Cramer v. United States, 261 U.S. 219 (1923); United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591
(1916); United States v. Pelican, 232 U.S. 442 (1914); United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S.
28, 45-46 (1913); Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 675 (1912); Heckman v. United States, 224
U.S. 413, 437-38 (1912); Tiger v. Western Investment Co., 221 U.S. 286 (1911); Lone Wolf
v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 564 (1903); Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294, 305
(1902); Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas Ry., 135 U.S. 641 (1890); United Statei v.
Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886); Fellows v. Blacksmith, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 366 (1856);
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet) 1 (1831).
at 4-5 May 17, 1977.

I°

AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REinsw CoNimIssloN, FINAL REPORT

it

See e.g., Treaty with the Tribes of Middle Oregon, June 25, 1855.

That the exclusive right of taking fish in the streams running
through and bordering said reservation is hereby secured to said
Indians; and at all other usual and accustomed stations, in
common with citizens of the United States, and of erecting
suitable houses for curing the same; also the privilege of
hunting, gathering roots and berries, and pasturing their stock on
3

fact that treaties were made at all) are proof of the federal government's recognition of tribal
sovereignty.'
Federal trust obligations are frequently analogized to common law trust principles."
Under common law trust principles, the trustee has a duty to administer the trust property
solely in the interest of the beneficiary!' The Supreme Court has stated that the federal
trustee has the "duty in administering the trust to exercise such care and skill as a man of
ordinary prudence would exercise in dealing with his own property."" The United States has
a duty to account to the tribes for its performance of treaty obligations." If the federal trustee
is negligent in its dealings with the tribes' property, it is liable for any losses."
APPLICATION OF TRUST PRINCIPLES
The federal government and its agencies are subject to the United States' fiduciary
responsibilities to tribes." All federal actions and the implementation of federal statutory
schemes affecting Indian people, land or resources must be "judged by the most exacting

unclaimed lands, in common with citizens, is secured to them.
12 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet) 515, 538 (1832).
13 AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT 127 May 17, 1977.
14 See Manchester Band of Porno Indians v. United States, 363 F.Supp. 1238, 1245 (N.D.
Cal. 1973)(citing Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 170(1) (1959)).
13 United States v. Mason, 412 U.S. 391, 398 (1973), citing A. Scott, Trusts § 1408 (3rd
ed. 1967). See also Coast Indian Community v. United States, 550 F.2d 639, 652-53 (Ct C.
1977); Covello Indian Community v. FERC, 895 F.2d 581, 585 (9th Cir. 1990)(citing
Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes v. Board of Oil and Gas Conservation, 792 F.2d 782, 794 (9th
Cir. 1982)).
Id Navajo Tribe of Indians v. United States, 624 F.2d 981, 990 (Ct C. 1980).
17

Coast Indian Community, 550 F. 2d at 653.

13 See e.g., Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. United States Department of the
Navy, 898 F.2d 1401, 1411 (9th Cir. 1991); Covello Indian Community v. FERC, 895 F.2d
581, 584 (9th Cir. 1990); Nance v. EPA, 645 F.2d 701, 711 (9th Cir. 1981), cen. denied, 454
U.S. 1081 (1981).

4

fiduciary standards."' The United States' trust obligations extend to all federal agencies
including those that manage fisheries, water projects, hydroprojects, and federal lands.'"
One of the more significant cases applying the trust doctrine to the management of
tribal fishery and water resources is Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Morton?' In Pyramid
Lake, the Paiute Tribe sought and obtained a federal court order enjoining diversions from the
Truckee River upstream from Pyramid Lake, a desert lake located totally within the Paiute's
reservation and fed by the Truckee River.' The upstream diversions threatened the lake's
quality and the upstream spawning of two species of fish upon which the tribe historically
depended.
The Paiute Tribe's challenge arose in response to the Secretary of Interior's proposed
regulation which called for massive diversions from the Truckee River. The court found that
the Secretary's self-described "judgment call" regarding the quantity of water to be diverted
was an abuse of discretion. The court stated that the Secretary:
•

misconceived the legal requirements that should have governed his action. A
'judgment call' was simply not legally permissible.... The burden rested on the
Secretary to justify any diversion of water from the Tribe with precision. It

19 Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296-97 (1942). See also United
States v. Mason, 412 U.S. 391, 398 (1973).
See e.g., Nance v. Environmental Protection Agency, 645 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1981);
Covello Indian Community v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 895 F.2d 581 (9th Cir.
1990); Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. United States Department of Navy, 898 F.2d
1410 (9th Cir. 1990); Assiniboine & Sioux Tribes v. Board of Oil and Gas Conservation, 792
F.2d 782 (9th Cir. 1986); Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes of Oklahoma v. United States, 512 F.2d
1390 (Ct.CI. 1975).
21

354 F.Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1972).

22

At issue was the Secretary of Interior's "judgment call" in recommending a regulation
allowing 378,000 acre feet of water to be diverted from the Truckee River for irrigation
purposes. If not diverted, the water would flow into Pyramid Lake, located on the tribe's
reservation and historically the tribe's principle source of livelihood. The extensive irrigation
diversions severely impacted the lahontan cutthroat trout and cui-ui, fish which tribal
members had historically depended on. These fish were placed on the federal threatened and
endangered lists in 1975 and 1967 respectively. See generally Carson-Truckee Water
Conservancy District v. Watt, 549 F.Supp 704 (1982).
5

was not his function to attempt an accommodation.'
The court held that the Secretary of Interior violated his trust obligation to protect the Paiute
Tribe's fishery.' Judge Gesell further held that a contract between the Secretary of the
Interior and the Secretary of Agriculture that governed reservoir management could not be
advanced as an obstacle to maintaining fish flows.' Pyramid Lake mandates that federal
agencies both recognize and act in accordance with their fiduciary obligation to tribes.'
The obligations created by the trust doctrine extend to federal actions taken off
reservation which impact life and resources on reservation. In Northern Cheyenne Tribe," the
federal district court of Montana declared that a "federal agency's trust obligation to a tribe
extends to actions it takes off a reservation that uniquely impact tribal members or property
on a reservation?" Not even the nation's need for energy development justified disregard of

23

24

354 F.Supp. at 256.
The Secretary was obliged to formulate a closely developed regulation that would
preserve water for the Tribe. He was further obliged to assert his statutory and
contractual authority to the fullest extent possible to accomplish this result.... The
Secretary's action is therefore doubly defective and irrational because it fails to
demonsli ate an adequate recognition of his fiduciary duty to the Tribe. This also is an
abuse of discretion and not in accordance with law. Id at 256-57.

/Th

Id.
In order to fulfill his fiduciary duty, the Secretary must insure, to the extent of
his power, that all water not obligated by court decree or contract with the
District goes to Pyramid Lake. The United States, acting through the Secretary
of the Interior, 'has charged itself with moral obligations of the highest
responsibility and trust. Its conduct, as disclosed in the acts of those who
represent it in dealings with the Indians, should therefore be judged by the
most exacting fiduciary standards.' (citing Seminole Nation v. United States,
316 U.S. 286, 297 (1942)).

2s Id. at 258. "The Secretary's trust obligations to the Tribe are paramount in this
respect..."
26 Id. at 257.
27 Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hodel, 12 ILR 3065 (D.Mont, May 28, 1985) ced on
other grounds 842 F.2d 224 (9th Cir. 1988).
28 Id. at 3071.

Pm
6

the federal government's fiduciary duty."
The trust doctrine permeates every aspect of the federal government's relations with
Indian tribes. The federal government and its implementing agencies owe a duty to not only
recognize the impacts of their activities on the tribes, but also a duty to safeguard natural
resources which are of crucial importance to tribal self-government and prosperity. In
addition, the trust responsibility imposes an affirmative duty upon a federal agency to use its
particular expertise to protect tribal resources?'

THE RIGHT TO TAKE FISH
The right to take fish is integral to the Columbia River tribes' subsistence, culture,
religion and economy?' The Supreme Court recognized the importance of fish to the tribes
early in the development of treaty interpretation:

29 The court declared that:
The Secretary's conflicting responsibilities and federal actions taken in the
'national interest,' however, do not relieve him of his trust obligations. To the
contrary, identifying and fulfilling the trust responsibility is even more
important in situations such as the present case where an agency's conflicting
goals and responsibilities combined with political pressure asserted by nonIndians can lead federal agencies to compromise or ignore Indian rights. Id.

39 Mitchell II, 463 U.S. 206 (1983).
31 NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, COMPILATION OF INFORMATION ON SALMON
AND STEELHEAD LOSSES IN E COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN (March 1986).
A significant dependence upon salmon is the single feature that most of the
aboriginal groups in the Columbia River Basin shared.... inter-group trade made
salmon available to virtually all inhabitants of the Columbia Basin....The annual
salmon runs were accompanied by religious rituals and ceremonial rites such as
the First Salmon Ceremony, believed to ensure the continued return of the

salmon. The salmon also played an important role in Indian folklore, art,
music, and mythology. The timing and distribution of the runs were major
determinants of yearly patterns of group movement, the organization of
households, the division of labor, the size of local groups, and the nature of
social interactions among groups. Although the cultural value of the salmon to
the Columbia Basin Indians cannot be quantified or adequately characterized,
undoubtedly much of what is distinctive about the aboriginal cultures can be
attributed to their relationship to the salmon. Id. at 29.
7

The right to resort to...fishing places...was a part of larger rights possessed by
the Indians, upon the exercise of which there was not a shadow of impediment,
and which were not much less necessary to the existence of the Indians than
the atmosphere they breathed."
In 1855, separate treaties with the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian
Reservation, the Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation of Oregon, the
Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Indian Nation, and the Nez Perce Tribe were
negotiated with representatives of the United States government" Retaining the right to
continue traditional fishing practices was a primary objective of the Columbia River tribes
during treaty negotiations." Each treaty contained a substantially identical provision reserving
to the tribes the right take "fish at all usual and accustomed places in common with citizens
of the United States."' The fishing clause is the heart of the Columbia River tribes' treaties.'
The Columbia River tribes' treaty fishing rights were explicitly reserved. They are
property rights and thus, if abrogated, require compensation under the Fifth Amendment of
the United States Constitution." Fishing rights are the communal property of the tribes."
The Columbia River tribes each reserved the right to take fish (1) within their respective

32 United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905). See also United States v.
Washington, 506 F.Supp. 187, 203 (W.D. Wash. 1980) ("Virtually every case construing this
[reservation of fishing rights] ... has emphasized its overriding importance to the tribes.").
33 Treaty with the Yakima Tribe, June 9, 1855, 12 Stat 951; Treaty with the Tribes of
Middle Oregon, June 25, 1855, 12 Stat. 963; Treaty with the Umatilla Tribes, June 9, 1855,
12 Stat 945; Treaty with the Nez Perce Tribe, June 11, 1855, 12 Stat 957.
34 Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681, 684-85 (1942).
35

Treaty with the Tribes of Middle Oregon, June 25, 1855, 12 Stat. 963, Article I.

36

Passenger Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. 658, 664-69 (1979) (discussing that the importance
of the fishery resource to the tribes was a key consideration during the treaty negotiations).
32 United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371 (1980); Menominee Tribe v.
United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1963); Three Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation v. United
States, 390 F.2d 686 (Ct.CI. 1968); Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation v.
Alexander, 440 F.Supp. 553 (D.Or. 1977).
34 Whitefoot v. United States, 293 F.2d 658, 663 (CI.Ct. 1961)(holding that tribal
fisheries are communal property vested in the tribe and that compensation under the Fifth
Amendment must be paid to the tribe where fishing stations are destroyed or taken.), cert.
denied, 369 U.S. 818 (1962); Kimball v. Callahan, 590 F.2d 768, 773 (9th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 826 (1979).
8

reservations, 39 (2) at all usual and accustomed fishing sites on lands ceded to the United
States government," and (3) at all usual and accustomed fishing sites outside the reservation
or ceded areas.'

OFF-RESERVATION TREATY FISHING RIGHTS
In negotiating their treaties, the Columbia River tribes reserved the right to access
ceded aboriginal lands for a variety of reasons including the right to fish at their "usual and
accustomed places."' The treaty right to fish off-reservation preceded the statehoods of
Oregon, Washington and Idaho and was not subordinated to state law.' A state may not
regulate treaty off-reservation fishing activity unless it can first demonstrate that the regulation
is necessary for conservation of fish." Furthermore, states may not restrict treaty fishing in a

39 United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905)(stating "There was an exclusive
right of fishing reserved within certain boundaries"). See also Puyallup v. Department of
Game, 391 U.S. 392 (1968)[hereinafter Puyallup I].
Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S 681, 684 (1942).
41 Seufert Bros. v. United States, 249 U.S. 194, 198-99 (1919).
42

Treaty with the Yakima Tribe, June 9, 1855, 12 Stat. 951, Art. 3
The exclusive right of taking fish in all the streams, where running through or
bordering said reservation, is further secured to said confederated tribes and
bands of Indians, as also the right of taking fish at all usual and accustomed
places, in common with the citizens of the Territory, and of erecting temporary
buildings for curing them; together with the privilege of hunting, gathering
roots and berries, and pasturing their horses and cattle upon open and
unclaimed land.
See, e.g.,

43

United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 383 (1905).
By the Constitution, as is now well settled, the United States, having rightfully
acquired the Territories, and being the only Government which can impose
laws upon them, have the entire dominion and sovereignty, national and
municipal, Federal and State, over all the Territories, so long as they remain in
a territorial condition.
See also Sohappy v. Smith, 302 F.Supp. 899, 908 (D.Or. 1969); Holcomb v. Confederated
Tribes of Umatilla Indian Reservation, 382 F.2d 1013, 1014 (9th Cir. 1967).
(.3/4\

" Sohappy v. Smith, 302 F.Supp. 899, 907 (D.Or. 1969).

manner which favors non-treaty fishing or discriminates against Indians."
In the seminal case United States v. Winans, the Supreme Court confirmed that the
treaties made between Indians and the federal government preserved the right to fish at usual
and accustomed places free from interference.' In Winans, a non-Indian obtained title from
the state of Washington to lands bordering the Columbia River and including a usual and
accustomed Yalauna Nation fishing site." The non-Indian denied the Yakama Indians access
to their traditional fishing site by stationing a large fish wheel at the site. In a landmark
decision, the Supreme Court held that a servitude existed providing a right of access to
Yalcama tribal members across the non-Indian's land. 48 This servitude, part of the tribe's
immemorial right, superseded the non-Indian's fee simple title to the land." The reserved
fishing right "was intended to be continuing as against the United States and its grantees as
well as against the state and its grantees?"

Winces most significant contribution to Federal Indian law lies in its articulation of
the reserved rights doctrine: "the treaty was not a grant of rights to the Indians, but a grant of
rights from them -- a reservation of those not granted." 51 Winans stands as an explicit
recognition that Columbia River tribes retain an aboriginal fishing right that has resided with
these tribes since time immemorial." The Winans reserved rights doctrine is the law today."

45 Department of Game of Washington v. Puyallup Tribe, 414 U.S. 43 (1973)[hereinafter
Puyallup Ilj; Maison v. Confederated Tribes of Umatilla Indian Reservation, 314 F.2d 169
(9th Cir. 1963); Sohappy v. Smith, 302 F.Supp. 899 (D.Or. 1969).
48 United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
47 Id. at 372.
48 Id. at 381.
49

1d.

5° Id. at 381-82.
51 Id. at 381.
52 See Sohappy v. Smith, 302 F. Supp. 899, 906 (D.Or. 1969), ced 529 F.2d 570 (9th
Cir. 1976). Accord United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1984).
" See e.g., Passenger Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. 658, 678 (1979); United States v.
Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 327 (1978); United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1413 (9th Cir.
1987).
(Th
10

STANDARDS OF FISH ALLOCATION AND CONSERVATION
The Columbia River tribes continue to rely on their right take fish from the Columbia
River system for commercial, ceremonial and subsistence purposes. Historically, tribal groups
managed and regulated fishing along stretches of the river. Traditional authority groups
evolved into regional committees. For example, the Celli° Fish Committee presided over
fishing between Celilo Falls and John Day Falls. The Celilo Committee determined who
could fish when and had the authority to punish violators.54
With the development of non-Indian commercial fishing at the end of the 19th
Century, the tribal fisheries faced unprecedented competition. Fishery habitat was
simultaneously impacted by non-Indian activities including hydroelectric development,
logging, mining, grazing, irrigation, and pollution." Compounding the threat posed by overharvesting and environmental degradation was the failure of state fishing regulations to
accommodate tribal needs or to recognize tribal authority over fishing at usual and
accustOmed places. Operating under the Columbia River Compact of 1918, 56 Oregon and
Washington set the location, time, and harvest ceilings for commercial fisheries in the
Columbia River. The states allowed most of the harvestable salmon to be taken by nonIndians.' The combination of the decline of the fishery resource and discriminatory state
regulation made the interpretation of the treaty right to take fish critical for the Columbia
River tribes."

CONSERVATION LIMIT ON TREATY FISHING RIGHTS
An early step in the definition of the Columbia River tribes' right to take fish occurred
in 1963 when members of the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation sought
declaratory relief from the state of Oregon's restrictions on tribal salmon and steelhead fishing

Interview with Delbert Frank, Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation
of Oregon (on tape at the Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission).
" NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, COMPILATION OF INFORMATION ON SALMON
AND STEELHEAD LOSSES IN THE COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN 23, March 1986; WASHINGTON
OFFICE OF PROGRAM RESEARCH, UNDERSTANDING ALLOCATION 5, August 1988.
56 Columbia River Compact of 1918, ch. 47, 40a Stat 515 (1918).
57

Passenger Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. 658, 669 (1979).

58

Id. at 670.
11

on tributaries of the Columbia and Snake Rivers." In Maison, the court held that the
Umatilla's 1855 treaty reserved to them "those unimpeded fishing rights which their ancestors
had long enjoyed before the treaty."' The right to take fish unimpeded was qualified only by
the need to conserve the fishery resource.' In order to demonstrate the necessity of
conservation, the state must show "that there is a need to limit the taking of fish ...[and]... that
the particular regulation sought to be imposed is 'indispensable' to the accomplishment of the
needed limitation." The court further limited the state's authority to regulate treaty fishing
rights by indicating that restrictions on treaty fishing were indispensable only where
conservation could not be accomplished through alternative conservation measures?
Also in 1963, the State of Washington filed suit seeking to confirm its regulatory
authority over tribal fishing in Commencement Bay at the mouth of the Puyallup River."
In Puyallup I, the Supreme Court found that the State may not regulate the actual treaty right
to harvest fish but may regulate the manner of fishing, the size of the take, and similar
matters in the interests of conservation, "provided the regulation meets appropriate standards
and does not discriminate against the Indians."'
In Antoine v. Washington, the Supreme Court provided further guidance concerning its
finding in Puyallup I:
[A]lthough, these rights "may. . . not be qualified by the State,. . . the manner
of fishing [and hunting], the size of the take, the restriction of commercial
fishing [and hunting], and the like may be regulated by the State in the interest
of conservation, provided the regulation meets appropriate standards and does
not discriminate against the Indians." The "appropriate standards" requirement
means that the State must demonstrate that its regulation is a reasonable and
necessary conservation measure,... and that its application to the Indians is

" Maison v. Confederated Tribes of Umatilla Indian Reservation, 314 F.2d 169 (9th
Cir.), cm. denied, 375 U.S. 829( 1963).
60

Id. at 171.

61

Id. at 172 (citing Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681 (1942); United States v. Winans,
198 U.S. 371 (1905)).
62 Id

" Id. at 173.
64 Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game of Washington, 391 U.S. 392 (1968) (Puyallup
65 Id. at 398.
12

necessary in the interest of conservation."

The issues addressed by the Antoine Court concerning when it is appropriate for the
government to regulate tribal treaty rights may be outlined as follows:
1.

Is there a cOnservation need for the imposition of regulatory
measures?

1

If so, do the proposed regulatory measures meet "appropriate
standards?'

3.

a.

Are the regulatory measures a reasonable
and necessary conservation measure?

b.

Is the application of conservation measures
to the Indians necessary in the interest of
conservation?

If it is necessary to apply the regulatory measures to the exercise of tribal
treaty rights, are they being applied in a discriminatory manner?

Point 2b in this outline is critical, because this is where the determination is made when and
if regulation of tribal treaty hunting, fishing, and gathering activities is permitted. Several
courts have addressed this point. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated the following:
Direct regulation of treaty Indian fishing in interests of conservation is
permissible only after the state has proved unable to preserve a run by
forbidding the catching of fish by other citizens under its ordinary police power
jurisdiction.°

" Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 207 (1975) (citing Puyallup I, 391 U.S. at .
398) (emphasis added). Subsequent to Antoine, the Ninth Circuit determined that the
exercise of tribal rights may be regulated in order to maintain a reasonable "margin of
safety" against extinction. United States v. Oregon, 718 F.2d 299, 305 (9th Cir. 1983). See
also United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 342 (W. D. Wash. 1974) (regulation
limited to preventing demonstrable harm to actual conservation of fish, with conservation
referring to species perpetuation), cifd, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1086 (1976), reh'g denied, 424 U.S. 978 (1976); Sohappy v. Smith, 302 F. Supp. 899, 908
(D.Or. 1969) (state can regulate only if existence of fish resource is imperiled).
67 U.S. v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676, 686 (9th Cir. 1975), citing Antoine v. Washington,
420 U.S. 194 (1975).
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In other words, the courts have stated as part of the conservation necessity principle that the
regulation of Indian treaty activities is only permissible if it is not possible to achieve the
conservation measures by imposing restrictions on non-treaty activities that impact the treaty
resource. The above scheme also demonstrates that the requirement that a regulatory measure
be a "reasonable and necessary conservation measure" is only one of several prerequisites
clearly set out in federal case law which must be met before the exercise of tribal treaty rights
may be limited. Although the conservation standards have developed historically in the
context of attempted state regulation of Indian treaty rights, the legal principles apply with
equal force to any federal proposal to restrict treaty rights.'

/Th

In United States v. Musette the court applied the "conservation necessity" principle
articulated in the Antoine/Puyallup cases when it considered the application of the Migratory

Bird Treaty Act (MBTA) to the treaty rights of the Chippewa Indian Tribe to sell migratory
bird feathers? Indeed, the federal government argued in this case that federal regulation
pursuant to the MBTA met the requirements of Puyallup."
More recently, in Makah v. Brown a district court found that the "conservation
necessity" principle is applicable to regulation by federal government.' Regarding the
applicable standard which the Secretary of Commerce must use to determine allocations to
treaty and non-treaty fishers, the court held:
In formulating his allocation decisions, the Secretary must accord treaty fishers
the opportunity to take 50% of the harvestable surplus of halibut in their usual

a Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Assn., 443
U.S. 658, 688 (1979). See also, Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Reservation v.
Alexander, 440 F. Supp. 553 (D. Or. 1977) (enjoining federal dam construction); Hoh Indian
Tribe v. Baldridge, 522 F. Supp. 683, 685 (W.D. Wash. 1981)(Secretary of Commerce to
develop salmon management plan that includes "practical and flexible rules for management
of fisheries in accordance with the Tribes' treaty rights"); United States v. Williams, 898 F.2d
727, 730 and n.4 (9th Cir. 1990), (finding that the government must establish the validity of
wildlife laws through a showing of conservation necessity before enforcing the laws against
members of tribes with hunting and fishing treaty rights); United States v. Fryberg, 622 F.2d
1010, 1015 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Bressette, 761 F. Supp. 658, 664 (D. Minn.
1991). Accord (Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. Hall, 698 F. Supp 1504, 1520 (W.D. Wash.
1988) ( Federal court review of federal agency decision-making that purportedly violates
treaty Indian fishing rights is de novo)
69

70

United States v. Bressette, 761 F. Supp. 658, 664 (D. 1Vlinn. 1991).
Id.

Malcah v. Brown, No. 9213, Phase I Subproceeding No. 92-1, No. C85-1606R, slip op.
(W.D. Wash. Dec. 29, 1993) (order on five motions relating to treaty halibut fishing).
71
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and accustomed fishing grounds, and the harvestable surplus must be
determined according to the conservation necessity princinle.n
The court further noted that the federal defendants did not disagree with the application of the
"conservation necessity" standard in principle. The court explicitly rejected the argument that
"only state and not federal regulatory agencies are bound by the conservation necessity
Since rights granted pursuant to treaties are rights granted to the United States from
the tribes and the tribes reserve all those rights not granted, treaty rights should be afforded
the highest priority possible.' Further, treaties and other agreements made with Indians are to
be broadly construed and ambiguities resolved in favor of the Indians." The preservation of
treaty rights is the responsibility of the entire federal government'
Acknowledgement that treaty rights are to receive the highest protection possible leads
to the conclusion that non-treaty impacts on treaty resources must be minimized to permit the
fulfillment of teary promises. In a decision concerning state regulation of off-reservation
treaty fishing rights, the court noted that it must be demonstrated that the required
conservation cannot be achieved by restrictions on non-treaty citizens, or other less restrictive
methods." As the court stated in United States v. Washington:
If alternative means and methods of regulation and necessary conservation are
necessary conservation are available, the state cannot lawfully restrict the

n Id.; Slip op. at 6 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
" Id. at 6-7.
74

United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905).

See, e.g., Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S.681, 684-85 (1942) ("It is our responsibility
to see that the terms of the treaty are carried out, so far as possible .. . in a spirit which
generously recognizes the full obligation of this nation to protect the interests of a dependent
people." (citations omitted)); Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363 (1930); Winters v. United
States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
75

76 United States v. Eberhardt, 789 F.2d 1354, 1363-64 (9th Cir. 1986) (Beeza, J.,
concurring) ("Cooperation among all agencies of the government is essential to preserve
those Indian fishing rights to the greatest extent possible.").
77 Lac Court Oreilles Band of Indians v. Wisconsin, 668 F. Supp. 1233, 1236-37 (WD.
Wis. 1987). See also, United States v. Michigan, 505 F. Sup. 467, 474-75 (WD. Mich. 1980)
("To regulate Indian fishermen first, to apply the same regulations to them as to non-treaty
fishermen, is to render the treaty rights nugatory.") (citations omitted).
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exercise of off-reservation treaty right fishing, even if the only alternatives are
restriction of fishing by non-treaty fishermen, either commercially or otherwise,
to the full extent necessary for conservation of fish."
Thus, in cases decided subsequent to Puyallup and Antoine, courts have demanded a
specific finding of necessity to regulate the Indians. If adequate conservation may be effected
by regulating other users with lesser rights, it is not permissible to regulate a tribe's exercise
of its reserved hunting and fishing rights." When a treaty right is implicated, the specific
impact of Indian activities under a treaty must be-examined separately from activities of nonIndians. It is not appropriate to lump Indians and non-Indians together in a general
assessment.' 0

TREATY RIGHT TO A FAIR SHARE
Federal district courts in Oregon and Washington assumed and retained continuing
jurisdiction over two suits initiated in the wake of Maison and Puyallup I. In 1968, fourteen
Yakama Tribal members filed suit to enjoin the state of Oregon's interference with their offreservation fishing rights? This case was consolidated with United States v. Oregon,
initiated by the United States as trustee of tribes against the state of Oregon. Judge Belloni
held that the treaties gave the Columbia River tribes "an absolute right" to the fishery and
thus to a "fair share of the fish produced by the Columbia River system." 82 Although the
court recognized the conservation standard, the court held that treaty fishing rights should
receive co-equal priority with conservation? The court further defined the state's

78

384 F. Supp. at 342.

79

Accord State v. Tinno, 497 P.2d 1386, 1397 (Idaho 1972) (McQuade, C.J., concurring

specially) (treaty affords tribal members first priority to fish).
" Id. at 1396 (identical state regulation of non-Indians and Indians with treaty rights
would provide essentially no treaty rights at all).
81 Sohapp3r v. Smith, 302 F.Supp. 899 (D.Or. 1969)
82 Id. at 911.
83 Id.
In determining what is an 'appropriate' regulation one must consider the
interests to be protected or objective to be served. In the case of regulations
affecting Indian treaty fishing rights the protection of the treaty right to take
fish at the Indian's usual and accustomed places must be an objective of the
state's regulatory policy co-equal with the conservation of fish runs for other
users.
16
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responsibility toward the tribes, holding that "restrictions on the exercise of the treaty right
must be expressed with such particularity that the Indian can know in advance of his actions
precisely the extent of the restriction which the state" may legitimately impose for
conservation purposes."
In subsequent proceedings, the court determined that a "fair share" meant a 50-50
division of the harvest.' The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Washington, confirmed that
"fair share" means a 50-50 division of the harvestable number of fish that may be taken."
Furthermore, the allocation percentage includes hatchery reared fish." There are several
reasons to include hatchery fish in the tribes allocation, including: (1) the lack of state
ownership of the fish once released; (2) the lack of unjust enrichment of the Tribes; (3) the
fact that hatchery fish and natural fish are not distinguished for other purposes; and (4) the
mitigating function of hatchery fish."

"Id
Sohappy v. Smith No. 68-409 (D.Or. August 20, 1975) (Preliminary Injunction Order);
Sohappy v. Smith No. 68-409 (D.Or. May 8, 1974) (Order Dissolving Temporary Restraining
Order).
The Indian treaty fishermen are entitled to have the opportunity to take up to
50 percent of the spring Chinook run destined to reach the tribes' usual and
•
accustomed grounds and stations. By "destined to reach the tribes' usual and
accustomed grounds and stations," I am referring to that portion of the spring
run which• would, in the course of normal events, instinctively migrate to these
places except for prior interception by non-treaty harvesters or other artificial
factors (emphasis added).
See also United States v. Oregon, No. 68-513 (D.Or. August 10, 1976) (Temporary
Restraining Order).
116 United States v. Washington, 384 E Supp. 312, 343 (WD. Wash. 1974), ced 520
F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976)[hereinafter Phase I]. (In 1974,
following Phase I, Washington intervened as defendant in United States v. Oregon.) See
United States v. Oregon, 699 F.Supp. 1456, 1459 (D.Or. 1988).
87

United States v. Washington, 759 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1985).

88

Id at 1359.
The hatchery programs have served a mitigating function since
their inception in 1859. They are designed essentially to replace
natural fish lost to non-Indian degradation of the habitat and
commercialization of the fishing industry. Under these
circumstances, it is only just to consider such replacement as
subject to treaty allocation. For the Tribes to bear the full
burden of the decline caused by their non-Indian neighbors
17

After a decade of state defiance of federal court orders regarding Indian fishing rights,
the United States Supreme Court granted certiori in the Washington state and federal cases to
resolve the character of the Indian treaty right to take fish." In Passenger Fishing Vessel, the
Supreme Court endorsed the 50-50 allocation previously adopted in Sohappy v. Smith and
Phase I."
The Court explicitly rejected the Washington Game Department's suggestion that treaty
fishermen be given only an "equal opportunity," to take fish with non-treaty fishermen.' The
Court reasoned:
That each individual Indian would share an 'equal opportunity' with thousands
of newly arrived individual settlers is totally foreign to the spirit of the
negotiations. Such a 'right,' along with the $207,500 paid the Indians, would
hardly have been sufficient to compensate them for the millions of acres they
ceded to the Territory.'
In rejecting the Game Department's argument, the Court relied on the principals established in
six of its prior decisions which addressed the Indian treaty right to take fish. The Court
found that: (1) by treaty, Indians have rights beyond those held by other citizens;" (2) state
regulations of treaty fishing are only sustainable if they are necessary for conservation?' and
(3) regulations must not be imposed in a discriminatcry maruter.95

In Passenger Fishing Vessel, the Court found that Indian tribes were guaranteed the

without sharing the replacement achieved through the hatcheries
would be an inequity and inconsistent with the Treaty.

•

99 Passenger Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. 658, 662 (1979).
90

Id.

91

Id. at 682.

92 Id. at 657-58.
93 Id at 681 (citing Seufert Brothers v. United States, 249 U.S. 194 (1918); Tulee v.
State of Washington, 315 U.S. 682 (1942)).
94 Id. at 682 (citing Puyallup I).
95 Id. at 682-83 (citing Puyallup II).
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right to harvest sufficient fish to ensure "a moderate living."' Moderate living needs are not
being met.' Since 1965, the Columbia River tribes have not had a commercial fishery on
summer chinook." Since 1975, except 1977, the tribes have not had a commercial fishery on
spring chinook." Ceremonial and subsistence fisheries are currently a fraction of tribes'
actual needs. w° Such curtailment of tribal commercial, ceremonial and subsistence fisheries
effectively undermines a tribe's opportunity to achieve a moderate standard of living.
In United States v. Adair, the Ninth Circuit stated that:
Implicit in this "moderate living" standard is the conclusion that Indian tribes
are not generally entitled to the same level of exclusive use and exploitation of
a natural resource that they enjoyed at the time that they entered into the treaty
reserving their interest in the resource, unless, of course, no lesser level will
supply them with a moderate living.'"

Few could reasonably argue that the tribal harvest presently yields a moderate living.'02 If a

96

Id at 686

It bears repeating, however, that the 50% figure imposes a maximum but not a
minimum allocation. As in Arizona v. California and its predecessor cases, the
central principle here must be that Indian treaty rights to a natural resource that
once was thoroughly and exclusively exploited by the Indians secures so much
as, but no more than, is necessary to provide the Indians with a livelihood--that
is to say, a moderate living.
97

United States v. Washington, 506 F.Supp. 187, 208 (W.D.Wash. 1980).

TECHNICAL AnvisoRy CovimmrEE, 1991 Au, SPECIES REVIEW COLUMBIA RIVER
MANAGEMENT PLAN 2 (May 10, 1991).
98

" Id at 6.
I" Id
101 United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1415 (9th Cir. 1984)(emphasis added).
1°2 The Northwest Power Planning Council offered a conservative estimate that in the
early 1800s a population of 50,000 to 62,000 Columbia Basin aboriginal peoples caught
approximately 5 to 6 million fish annually, almost 97 fish per individual. COMPILATION OF
INFORMATION ON SALMON AND STEELHEAD LOSSES IN THE COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN at 74. In
1990, the Yakima Nation, Umatilla Confederated Tribes, Warm Springs and Nez Perce Tribe,
whose members number approximately 16,000, took only 77,000 fish, or under five fish per
person. TECHNICAL ADVISORY CO/a 1991 ALL SPECIES REVIEW COLUMBIA RIVER
FISH MANAGEMENT PLAN (May 10, 1991).
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moderate standard of living can only be achieved by the "same level of exclusive use and
exploitation" as at the treaty time, then Adair suggests that exclusive use by Indians should be
permitted.
Although this reading of Adair appears to conflict with the 50-50 allocation standard
and "in common with" treaty language, it is nonetheless consistent with the federal
government's responsibility to protect the treaty reserved right to take fish!' Arguably,
because neither the government nor the tribes could have anticipated the dramatic decline in
the fishery resource, strict interpretation of the "in common with" language is inappropriate.
Indeed, in Passenger Fishing Vessel, the Court found that "neither party realized or intended
that their agreement would determine whether, and if so how, a resource that had always been
thought inexhaustible would be allocated between the native Indians and the incoming settlers
when it later became scarce."'"
Treaties must be construed as they would have been naturally understood by Indians!'
There was no question at treaty time that Indians could harvest as many fish as they needed.
The tribes' insistence during treaty negotiations that the treaties preserve their right to fish at
usual and accustomed places is evidence of the tribes' intent to guarantee themselves and their
future generations the right to harvest as many fish as they needed!'

103 Tulee v. State of Washington, 315 S.Ct. 682, 683 (1942).
In United States v. Winans, ...this Court held that, despite the phrase 'in
common with citizens of the territory', [sic] Article DI conferred upon the
Yakimas continuing rights, beyond those which other citizens may enjoy, to
fish at their 'usual and accustomed places' in the ceded area...It is our
responsibility to see that the terms of the treaty are carried out, so far as
possible, in accordance with the meaning they were understood to have by the
tribal representatives at the council and in a spirit which generously recognizes
the full obligation of this nation to protect the interests of a dependent
people. ")(emphasis added)(citations omitted).
1" Passenger Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. 658, 669 (1979).
1°5 Id. at 676.
106

Id at 675-76.
A treaty...is essentially a contract between two sovereign nations...it is
reasonable to assume that they negotiated as equals at arm's length...When
Indians are involved, this Court...has held that the United States, as the party
with the presumptively superior negotiating skills and superior knowledge .of.
the language in which the treaty is recorded, has a responsibility to avoid
taking advantage of the other side. "The treaty• must therefore be construed...in
the sense in which [the words] would naturally be understood by the Indians."
(citations omitted).
20
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Furthermore, tribes should not be asked to bear the burden of resource conservation
when non-treaty development activities and fisheries are primarily responsible for the
continuing diminishment of the fishery resource. Indian treaties must be liberally construed in
favor of the Indians.' Thus, when state or federal actions threaten treaty fisheries, through
environmental degradation, over-harvesting, or otherwise, those actions should be restricted
before the tribal treaty harvest is reduced. As a party to the Columbia River Fish
Management Plan, the federal government is obligated under United States v. Oregon to
protect and enhance tribal treaty fisheries.' Likewise, courts have repeatedly recognized that
states may assert their police power to regulate the non-treaty harvest given reasonable
circumstances while regulation of treaty fisheries may occur only when indispensable to
conservation purposes.'°9

THE ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARD
The right to take a fair share of fish as set forth in U.S. v. Oregon is meaningless if
there are no fish to be taken. Fish runs passing through usual and accustomed fishing sites
are threatened by the Columbia River hydro-electric system and environmental degradation,
including thermal pollution and sedimentation. The Columbia River tribes bargained in good
faith for a substantive fishing right when they ceded millions of acres to the United States.
The Supreme Court characterized the Indians' right to fish as a "right to 'take' — rather than
merely the 'opportunity' to try to catch."' The tribes reserved more than the right to

199 Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681, 684-85 (1942). See also Letter from Portland Area
Director of Bureau of Indian Affairs to Merrit Tuttle of National Marine Fisheries Service
(Sept 10, 1991)(Discussing the listing of Snake River spring, summer and fall chinook.)
Because the diminishment of the tribes' treaty reserved fisheries in the
Columbia Basin has occurred as a result of other land and water management
actions, the Bureaus of Indian Affairs urges the National Marine Fisheries
Service to ensure that, in the event of a listing, the allocation of the
conservation burden to protect the various salmon runs does not further deprive
the tribes of their treaty rights. In other words, MOPS must look to all other
factors to protect the resource before regulating treaty fisheries and address
those factors proportionately to the impacts they have caused.
I" Columbia River Fish Management Plan, Part I. A., B.
Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681 (1942); Maison v. Confederated Tribes of Umatilla
Indian Reservation, 314 F.2d 169 (9th Cir. 1963); Holcomb v. Confederated Tribes of
Umatilla Indian Reservation, 382 F.2d 1013, 1014 (9th Cir. 1967).
09
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ll° Passenger Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. 658, 678-679 (1979).
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"occasionally ...dip their nets into the territorial waters."1

Treaty Right of Access Imposes a Servitude Upon Lend
In U.S. v. Winans, the Court held that the tribes' reserved treaty right to fish at their
usual and accustomed places as a servitude upon the land!" As described in Winans, the
treaties reserved and recognized Native Americans' aboriginal "right in the land -- the right of
crossing it to the river -- the right to occupy it to the extent and for the purposes
mentioned."3 Commentators have also suggested that treaty fishing rights impose an
environmental servitude upon state and federal governments!" It is clear that in the realm of
treaty fishing rights, the states, federal government, and tribes share the responsibility created
by treaty to enhance and protect fish habitat!"

Non-Treaty Actors Must Not Impair or Destroy Habitat
In the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation v. Callaway settlement
agreement!' the court ordered federal water managers not to manipulate the Federal
Columbia River Power system (FCRPS) so as to inundate tribal fishing sites above the
Bonneville Dam!" In addition to the threat to the tribal fishing sites, experts feared that the
peaking proposal would adversely impact the migration of salmonid fish!" The court
concluded that the BPA and the Army Corps of Engineers were required to manage and
operate the FCRPS in a manner that did not "impair or destroy" the tribe's treaty fishing

111 Id. at 678-679. See also, Michael C. Blumm, Why Study Pacific Salmon Law? 22
629 (1985-86).

IDAH0 LAW REVIEW

112 United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371,381 (1905).
In Id.
114 See e.g., Gary D. Meyers, United States v. Washington (Phase II) Revisited:
Establishing an Environmental Servitude Protecting Treaty Fishing Rights, 67 UNIVERSITY OF
OREGON L. REV. 771, 784 (1988).
115 United States v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676, 685 (9th Cir. 1975).
116 Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation v. Callaway, No. 72-211
(D.Or. August 17, 1973).
"' Id. at 6.
118

Id.
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rights.'19
Similarly, the Oregon federal district court enjoined the Army Corps of Engineers from

constructing a dam and reservoir, despite Corps promises to mitigate the project's
environmental impacts. In Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation v.
Alexander,'" the court found that a proposed dam on Catherine Creek, a tributary to the
Grande Ronde River in Oregon, would nullify tribal treaty fishing rights by inundating the
tribes' usual and accustomed fishing stations and by preventing fish from migrating
upstream:21 Recognizing that only Congress can abrogate treaty rights and to do so it must
act expressly,122 the court found no express intent to abrogate the tribe's treaty rights?' In
fact, the court noted that Congress was not aware of the treaty fishing rights at that location
when it authorized the dam's construction.'

(1-\

In 1985, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a federal district court order which required water
to be released from a dam order to protect 60 spring chinook salmon redds from
destruction.125 In Kittitas Reclamation District, the Ninth Circuit held that it was not an abuse
of discretion for the district court to consider the Yalcama Nation's treaty fishing rights in its
interpretation of a consent decree regarding water rights to which the tribe was not a party. 126
The tribe's treaty fishing rights would have been violated unless the Department of Interior's
Bureau of Reclamation released water from three of its irrigation dams. Kittitas makes clear
that the water and hydro-power managers are under an obligation to provide sufficient
instream flows to protect treaty fisheries. To reduce instream flows below that which is
necessary to preserve spawning grounds is inconsistent with the tribes' established treaty

"9 Id. at 7.

12° Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Reservation v. Alexander, 440 F. Supp. 553
(D.Or. 1977).
121 Id at 555.
122 Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 413 (1963).
In Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation v. Alexander, 440 F.Supp.
533, 555-556 (D.Or. 1977).
124 Id.
Kittitas Reclamation District v. Surmyside Valley Irrigation District, 763 F.2d 1032,
1035 (9th Cir.1985).
126 Id. at 1034.
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rights.'"
The issue of whether treaty fishing rights create an environmental right arose again, in
Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. Hall.' Pending trial on the merits, the Muckleshoot and
Suquamish Indian Tribes sought a preliminary injunction to enjoin the construction of a
marina which threatened usual and accustomed fishing sites in Elliott Bay Small Craft
Harbor.'" The tribes claimed that the Corps of Engineers had failed to adequately evaluate
and mitigate the project's cumulative impacts on their treaty fishing rights.'" However,
District Court Judge Zilly found that it was unnecessary to decide the environmental issue.'"
Judge Zilly enjoined the construction of the marina finding it dispositive that the marina
would substantially impair and limit tribal access to usual and accustomed treaty fishing
sites.'"
Although the extent of the implied environmental right to protection of the treaty
fishery remains undefined by the courts, the specter it projects is' a valuable tool for tribes
when individual, state, or federal actions threaten treaty fisheries. For example, in 1989 and
1990, when landslides caused by clearcutting destroyed a holding pond for who, the Hoh
Tribe used the threat of litigation to negotiate better timber management practices. 33 It is
clear that the tribes' treaty fishing rights are more than rights to take fish vis-a-vis others who
wish to take fish; treaty fishing rights encompass the protection of the fishery habitat

CONCLUSION
Tribal fishing rights are as valuable to the Columbia River treaty tribes as the air they

122 Accord Joint Board of Control of Flathead Irrigation Dist, v. United States, 832 F.2d
1127 (9th Cir. 1987) (by allocating water to non-Indian irrigators, district court ignored
superior federal obligation to provide instream flows to protect fishery subject to treaty
rights); United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1983) (treaty reserving right to fish
also reserved sufficient water to support exercise of treaty fishing rights to provide tribe with
a "moderate living.").
Mucldeshoot Indian Tribe v. Hall, 698 F.Supp. 1504 (W.D. Wash. 1988).
I" Id. at 1504.

'"Id. at 1516.
"I Id. at 1517.
132 Id. at 1516.
133 Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 'July 2, 1992, at Al.
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breathe. In the Columbia RiVer Treaties, tribes reserved to themselves a right they have
practiced since time immemorial: the right to fish at all usual and accustomed fishing sites
regardless of where these sites are located. The tribes' fishing and hunting rights are the
principal components of the treaties and were intended to preserve a traditional way of life
that is centered around the river and its resources. These treaties did not presume to reserve
fishing and hunting rights, they guaranteed these rights both on and off the reservation along
with regulatory control and co-management authority as established through the interpretation
of the written word, otherwise known as the "canons of construction" and as further upheld in
the courts.
The Supreme Court has determined that the tribes are entitled to fifty percent of each
fish run destined to pass Indian fishing sites. However, the right to take fish is meaningless if
all or most of the fish are killed by non-Indian activities before they return to tribal fishing
grounds. Despite the commitments made in the treaties, subsequent history shows that the
intent of the treaties has been subverted. There are a multitude of methods by which nonIndians have directly or indirectly monopolized the fisheries and their habitat. To borrow
from the statements of the United States Attorney in United States v. Winans, the current nonIndian monopoly of Columbia Basin salmon and their habitat is "certainly an impotent
outcome to negotiations and a convention, which seemed to promise more and give the word
of the Nation for more."
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